

# **Artificial Knowledge**

## **An Evolutionary Approach**

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## DEDICATION

*For Colette: partner, wife, lover, mother of our children—but, more important than any of these, a true and enduring friend.*

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# Abstract

I present a new analysis of the *problem situation* in Artificial Intelligence (AI), grounded in a Popperian epistemology.

I first review arguments purporting to establish that no purely “computational” system can realise *genuine* mentality. I conclude that the question is still open; but that the more pressing question is whether such a system can even exhibit intelligent *behaviour*. Attention is thus directed at the computational embodiment of *knowledge*, and its *growth*. I suggest that much of the work in this area incorporates a flawed, naïve empiricist, epistemology. I adopt Popper’s view that the growth of knowledge is possible *only* through a process of *unjustified variation and selective retention*. In particular, the innate knowledge of biological organisms has arisen by such a process, in the form of Darwinian evolution.

I review previous work on the realisation of Darwinian processes in computational systems. In particular, I present a critical reinterpretation of von Neumann’s pioneering work in this area. I conclude that no system to date has exhibited substantive growth of artificial knowledge via a process of Darwinian evolution. More importantly, I argue that this problem is deeper than is generally recognised, requiring the effective integration of *autopoiesis* with *evolvability*. To achieve this it may ultimately be necessary to realise something analogous to the *genesis of life*. I review one proposal for such a phenomenon: Holland’s so-called  $\alpha$ -Universes. I present an *implementation* of a specific  $\alpha$ -Universe and review the (largely negative) results of empirical tests carried out on it.

I conclude with the claim that the problem of realising the spontaneous genesis of “artificial life” is of great difficulty, but that its solution may yet prove to be an essential prerequisite for the realisation of anything deserving to be called “artificial intelligence”.

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